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'ARMS DUMP AT GARDA HQ'

● Whistleblower dossier lifts lid on 'grave safety lapses'

● 'Shipping container full of seized weaponry secured by padlock'

● 'No official log of ammo, explosives and more than 100 guns'

AUTOMATIC firearms, ammunition and explosives were kept in a shipping container at Garda Headquarters without proper documentation or tracing and with negligible security, according to a series of protected disclosures that have been seen by the Irish Mail on Sunday.

EXCLUSIVE

By **John Lee** GROUP POLITICAL EDITOR

Detailed warning documentation and photographs about the 'dangers posed to [Garda] members and the public' were passed to An Garda Síochána chiefs, the former jus-

tice minister Helen McEntee and even the current Taoiseach.

The disclosures allege that the existence of the container shows:

■ A disregard for basic health and safety for Garda members working in Garda HQ and members of the public who enjoy nearby amenities like the Phoenix Park

■ A failure to properly secure such arms against being recirculated into the hands of criminal gangs with the container only locked with a combination padlock

■ A complete breakdown in the supposed system for securing chains of evidence or

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'Gardaí stored seized container secured by

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records of custody of materials in the position of An Garda Síochána.

The former Garda, who worked in the Garda armoury and first raised concerns over the extraordinarily chaotic and lax security around dangerous weapons and substances that had been seized by or handed in to gardaí, was ultimately arrested.

This arms dump is separate to the Firearms Store from which gardaí would be issued their firearms – and was used to house weaponry that, in many cases, was meant to have been destroyed.

According to previously secret documents seen by the MoS: 'a large store of arms, ammunition and certain explosives, which was completely undocumented and untracked' was kept in 'a large orange shipping container located in Garda HQ next to the

'Gross negligence and gross mismanagement'

[Garda] Hospital' since at least 2008.

The container held '...thousands of rounds of official AGS (An Garda Síochána) and seized ammunition, flares and fireworks, and in excess of one hundred firearms,' the whistleblower alleges.

To make matters worse, the container of largely undocumented and untraceable firearms, ammunition and explosives was secured by a lock that could be opened by a combination – a combination that had been shared beyond those ultimately responsible for firearms storage in An Garda Síochána, according to the protected disclosure.

The Garda whistleblower explained to his superiors as part of one of the protected disclosures: 'The dangers that this posed to [Garda] Members and the public are obvious. I also have concerns that there was no proper audit trail.' He also goes on to raise significant questions about procurement practices within the Firearms Stores.

A disclosure continues: 'It is my reasonable belief that this container was not suitable for the storage of firearms and tended to show...that the health and safety of any individual has been, is being, or is likely to be endangered and gross negligence and gross mismanagement.'

The MoS can confirm that these disclosures are from a separate source to the one who approached Labour TD Alan Kelly, who subsequently disclosed information about Garda firearms and equipment in Dáil Éireann on March 4.

The two separate sources – who the MoS understands are not in communication with each other – point to a significant corroboration of these serious allegations.

The MoS can also reveal that our source is connected to those who disclosed to us information about defective Garda automatic pistol holsters in 2023.

Today, the MoS reveals the details of the protected disclosure in the whistleblower's own words.

The whistleblower, who is a firearms expert and a former member of the armed forces, raises the pos-

sibility that firearms seized from criminals, or even official Garda firearms, that are not officially logged or audited could make or have made their way to criminals for the commission of a crime.

It has been previously reported by the Irish Times that a pump-action shotgun seized by the Garda made its way back into the hands of serious organised criminals.

The MoS also publishes photographs of a Sten automatic rifle handed in during a guns amnesty in 2006, which the whistleblower believes is the same one that can be seen in pictures taken inside the official Garda Firearms Store.

It also raises fresh questions over how the Garda handles chains of evidence and property in its custody. At a PAC hearing in March 2024, Garda Commissioner Drew Harris defended the controversial prosecution of a Garda for misuse of Garda property after he, during Covid, had given a bike from Garda stores to a pensioner.

Hundreds of pages of disclosures describe a concern for detail lacking in Garda firearm storage and auditing. The descriptive language in a protected disclosure to Taoiseach Micheál Martin in 2022 paints a shocking picture.

A protected disclosure reads: '... we were told that there was no register or contents log. This was truly shocking. Afterwards [colleague] and I spoke in private about how



LETHAL: Rifle handed in during a guns amnesty in 2006 (top) and same kind of weapon in the Garda Firearms Store in recent years

AN Garda Síochána is exempt from the Stores for Explosive Order 2007 due to Section 97 of the pre-independence era Explosives Act of 1875, which gives a blanket exemption to agencies of the State (then the Crown).

The 2007 order states the conditions explosives should be stored in, specifically well-built from brick, stone, concrete, iron or steel or excavated rock. It should prevent the ingress of moisture and adverse climate effects. It should be closed or protected to prevent access by unauthorised persons, and secured from external dangers. The general order even goes so far as to ascribe to the

Garda Commissioner the role of ensuring that any locking, alarm and surveillance/monitoring systems should be of a standard approved by the Commissioner. The standards also speak about the need for electrical fittings, lighting, heating, lightning protection, communications equipment and forklift/battery-operated vehicles to meet specific HSE and National Standards Authority of Ireland standards. The order goes on to say the relevant fire authority must be satisfied that fire detection, alarm, safety, resistance, escape routes and fire-fighting equipment are in accordance with the Guidance Document on Fire Safety.

unbelievable it was that this container was secured only by a combination number padlock, and not even a lock with a key.'

It continues: 'This container had no dedicated CCTV camera on it nor was there an access log which those entering would be required

'Jumble of different stores and rooms'

to fill out. The lack of any controls around such lethal equipment was contrary to everything I have ever learned in the Defence Forces about access to locations containing firearms, ammunition and volatile explosives.'

The storage is close to the Garda

HQ medical facility and a smoking area, according to the disclosure.

The force is exempt from basic health and safety standards for the storage of explosives/firearms, but the whistleblower points out that the basic safety principles in that legislation show how far removed the 'AGS orange container (stored and unmarked in Garda HQ) is from standards for similar firearms and ammunition stores operated by the Defence Forces or other public bodies required to store and issue firearms'.

The former Garda writes: 'It is extraordinary that in very heart of Garda HQ there was a disbursed [sic] system for storing and managing firearms and ammunition. There was no single secure location but rather a jumble of different inappropriate stores and rooms in which lethal materials were

stored. As a result, accounting, control, and management of such materials was impossible.'

An Garda and the Department of Justice were asked detailed questions about much of the information supplied to the MoS. The Justice department did not respond.

A Garda spokesman refused to comment specifically numerous times, but then added that the matters raised had been discussed by the force with its relevant oversight bodies.

In 2023, an MoS investigation revealed that a whistleblower had warned management and the Garda watchdog that gun holsters used by officers were 'not fit for purpose' before tragedies that led to the death of Detective Colm Horkan and left another officer with life-changing injuries.



arms in an orange a combination lock'



QUESTIONS:
Justice Minister
Jim O'Callaghan
and Garda
Commissioner
Drew Harris

The MoS previously revealed that Garda management and the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission were told of problems with the holsters in 2019.

This was before Garda Colm Horkan was shot dead in Castlerea, Co. Roscommon on June 17, 2020, with his own official firearm after killer Stephen Silver took the weapon from its holster. Just days earlier, on June 11, a garda's gun was accidentally discharged outside the Israeli Embassy, resulting in the officer suffering life-changing injuries. It recently emerged that 15 months after Det Garda Horkan was killed, a woman was able to take a firearm from the holster of a garda who was trying to arrest her partner, in Dublin.

Deputy Kelly has been pursuing the matter recently, in the Dáil, but has been frustrated at the responses he has received to his queries. Answers provided by the Department of Justice about when they became aware of the defective holsters – in response to questions from Mr Kelly on February 6 – had to be corrected twice. The department eventually conceded they knew about the matter in August 2020. Mr Kelly has also raised the matter of the storage of firearms and other materials at Garda HQ. However, the source of Mr Kelly's information is entirely different from the whistleblower whose disclosures we publish

today. The former garda who made the protected disclosures to his superiors first raised concerns in 2019. When detailed questions about the disclosures were put to them, a Garda spokesman responded: 'An Garda Síochána does not comment on remarks made by any third parties. As you have stated you are seeking responses arising from protected disclosures. An Garda Síochána is precluded by law from commenting on any matters subject to protected disclosures. An Garda Síochána cannot comment on ongoing investigations being carried out by either An Garda Síochána or Fiosrú. An Garda Síochána does not comment on matters pertaining to national security. An Garda Síochána does not comment on, confirm or deny the use of any building or other structure based within the An Garda Síochána Headquarters complex. In general, the matters raised by you have been attended to and discussed by An Garda Síochána with our relevant oversight bodies.'

A spokeswoman for An Taoiseach said: 'Section 16 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 requires that a discloser's identity be protected at all times. In line with the requirements of the Act, the Department does not comment on nor confirm the existence of any specific protected disclosure.'

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INJURIES/DEATH

THE following is an edited extract of the section from the Whistleblower's Protected Disclosure entitled 'Firearm Related Deaths and Injuries'

I HAVE formed a reasonable belief that because legitimate concerns raised by me and other AGS members about their firearms and holsters were ignored, that a number of members were subsequently injured. In addition, I highlighted a serious issue concerning springs in H1 of 2019 after two NSU members had their firearms suffer catastrophic failures after firing only one round of ammunition. I believe that this neglect was a fundamental breach of an essential duty of care...

THERE are other critical examples of injury arising from the absence of an essential and robust process. In July 2019, Garda Seán Dixon of the Armed Support Unit (ASU) based in Limerick had an accidental discharge in a vehicle in which he was injured. His firearm had not been checked by a Heckler & Koch certified armourer before it was issued to him and when he, and many ERU and SDU members, reported a possible weak spring or operational issue with the safety catch, [REDACTED1] was informed.

The firearm was in the vehicle with him as AGS refused to put firearm mounting brackets in the front of the vehicle to provide the user with quick access to their firearm. A system that has been in place in the Defence Forces for decades.

I believe the accidental discharge on the 11-06-2020 when an AGS member Garda Edward Connell was injured on duty in a life altering way by his Walther P99c may have been avoided had [REDACTED1] and [REDACTED2] adopted proper process and not simply having made the unilateral decision to issue these firearms to all members of AGS and with a holster

GARDA HERO:
Det Gda Colm
Horkan was
killed in 2020

incapable of secure retention. All the normal protocols of trial, evaluation, testing, user acceptance testing which the Defence Forces and other organisations would normally use, were never carried out. I am at a loss as to why such crucial process steps were skipped.

This is supported by their unsuccessful attempt to introduce the Walther P99 DAO full size and their ongoing concealment of Walther manufacturer issues. I believe this put AGS members at risk. The now recalled AGS Walther waist holster was notorious for not retaining the pistol securely and AGS member had to come up with their own method of securing the firearm. Also, the fact that the Walther P99c DAO issued to Garda Connell may have been one of the firearms with defective trigger springs, as yet not systematically recalled by Firearms Stores.

On 17-06-2020 Garda Colm Horkan was shot and killed when his firearm was removed from his holster. This model of holster was procured from [REDACTED4]. There was no manufacturer's authorisation for [REDACTED4] to manufacture holsters for their pistol. The natural leather materials used were variable in their consistency and the [REDACTED4] website illustrates the artisan manufacturing processes used. I now understand that without notice to the public or the Horkan family, these holsters have since been recalled by AGS per a HQ Directive issued long after the death of Garda Horkan. This tragedy is compounded by the fact that I highlighted, on numerous occasions, that the quality of the AGS issue waist belt holster and magazine pouches produced by [REDACTED4] were below acceptable levels for the

purpose intended. I highlighted this matter... around these holsters to GSOC at our meeting on September 9, 2019, and again in a text message on June 22, 2020. I know that best practice from my time in the Defence Forces. All lethal equipment and accessories require rigorous testing and evaluation before selection. This was not the method used by AGS and the Firearms Stores. With respect to this model holster specifically the specifications around firearm retention lacked detail. The variability of the manufactured product delivered to AGS was visible. Users complained and were simply offered a replacement holster. The materials became fatigued over time and were less rigid and able to contain and properly hold and present the gun. The tender specifications for the holsters were vague... The tender documents issued lacked the descriptive rigour that such a key accessory require. It is clear to me therefore, that the most profound questions arise around the procurement purposes used to specify and purchase these holsters (accessories)...

I am aware too that in the aftermath of Garda Horkan's death a number of articles appeared in the media concerning the quality of the holster he was using at the time of his murder. I believe that those who defected from this issue, sought to cover it up, delayed what should have been an immediate recall of these substandard products, engaged in the most serious wrongdoing which should be considered under the civil and criminal code. The disarming of Garda Horkan and his subsequent murder with his own AGS firearm may have been protected against if he had a holster with a designated level of retention. All of these matters require the most thorough and independent of investigations.



**CONTINUES
ON NEXT PAGE**

An arms dump with

■ The Garda Whistleblower has given us permission to publish details contained in his protected disclosures. The disclosures are voluminous and would fill many pages of this newspaper. We have chosen to focus on allegations that An Garda Síochána (AGS) operated an arms dump for seized weapons with little or no controls or safety precautions. These extracts are presented here with minimal editing.

ORANGE CONTAINER/ARMS DUMP

AGS ... used a large orange shipping container located in Garda HQ next to the hospital/offices of the CMO as an arms and ammunition dump. The metal shipping container was without any hazard warning and contained hundreds of thousands of rounds of official AGS and seized ammunition, flares, fireworks, propellant, knives, swords, incapacitant sprays, and in excess of one hundred firearms.

It is my professional opinion and in my reasonable belief, this container was not suitable for the storage of ammunition and pyrotechnics. Its existence tended to show the following relevant and serious wrongdoings: that (i) the health and safety of any individual has been, is being, or is likely to be endangered and, (ii) gross negligence and gross mismanagement in combining ammunition and volatile compounds in a single unsuitable space without any safety markings or appropriate security arrangements.

On the second occasion I visited the Orange Container in Garda Headquarters, shortly after I joined, I recalled that I was told that there was no manifest or log of its contents. Looking around to make a mental note, I discovered a 5kg container, approximately half full, of what I believed to be

double-base propellant, as it had the appearance of a fine grain. I immediately considered this a highly dangerous volatile risk. I immediately decided to neutralise it by filling the container with water and then distributing the contents into small water-immersed quantities so that it could be safely disposed of. Later that day I first raised the unsuitability of the container as an arms and ammunition store and the conditions I had witnessed within it.

I then sought the input of the national range inspector from the Department of Justice (a former Defence Forces Ordnance Officer), with respect to the appropriate legal framework governing such storage. He informed me that while AGS were exempt from the safe storage of ammunition legislation, he saw the container, its contents, its location, the absence of appropriate security and fire retarding systems as all creating a substantial risk. When I went on to describe to him the basis for my concerns about the storage of ammunition with fireworks and flares in a single unmarked container, he was shocked. He saw this as highly dangerous and illegal and described it as a most risky and dangerous practice.

AMMUNITION STORAGE

I later encountered a similar violation which poses perhaps an even greater threat. I learned that a large quantity of AGS official ammunition was stored in an unmarked room underneath the offices of the National Surveillance Unit (NSU). There, an unreinforced room, with specific fire suppression, was selected as an ammunition store. It was located in an area surrounded by office space and accessed by an inappropriate doorway leading on to a corridor. No markings suggesting the extreme risk was present in the event of fire. No hazard markings were displayed and nothing to suggest that an extreme hazard was present in an otherwise low risk area. The lethal and dangerous contents of the otherwise innocuous room may not have even been known to regular users of the building let alone any occasional visitors. There was no evidence of any consideration of the essential international standards for the storage of ammunition in selecting such a space. To my horror...

[REDACTED 1] told me calmly that there had been a fire in that very ammunition room previously but that 'thankfully' it had been successfully extinguished 'without highlighting the contents'. [THEY] went on to explain that if the contents were highlighted, people would request that such a hazard be moved out of HQ and that would be inconvenient. I was dumbstruck. The storage of possibly up to two million rounds of ammunition in an unmarked container beside occupied offices was reckless. There was no structural reinforcement, no 24hr supervision or even designated internal and external CCTV, there was no fire suppression system, no standard operating procedures for the storage of pyrotechnics.

DANGEROUS LOCATION

It is completely unacceptable that such dangerous materials would be stored together. Fireworks waste and in doing so, the chemicals which give rise to their flammability and explosive properties weep and become volatile over time. They are a dangerous fire hazard and to store them in proximity to live ammunition is to create a real risk of explosion.

The container was located on a public space. No markings were posted on the container. No warning to the passing public or to firefighters, fire marshal's or rescue staff. No logs set out what the contents of the Orange Container which would give some indication of the aged nature of its contents and no indications were provided as to when and by whom the various items were first committed to storage. There was no way of knowing what the risk status was of the materials essentially dumped in the container.

The container was located close to public walkways and the office of the Chief Medical Officer. It was in confined open ground and many large plate-glass windows on two floors of offices overlooked the space. In the event of fire/explosion, there was a real risk of significant injury or death to numerous personnel working in proximity.

Theft and illegal entry to the container was protected by a single combination lock. Given the contents of the container, these security arrangements were completely inappropriate. The stock control, date stamping and identification arrangements for the lethal materials in the container and its controllers were non-existent. The entire scheme failed to conform to the most basic standards for the storage and accounting of lethal materials.

3 BOXES

The Garda Whistleblower's disclosures include images he took of the contents of the container, including this one of inside one of the wooden boxes seen below. This is offered as an indication of the general contents of those boxes



2 INSIDE

This is the inside of the container storing items classified as being destroyed as of 1/9/2019



COMBINATION PADLOCK

The first time that [Garda Colleague] and I were shown the 'Orange Container', which contained a very disorganised inventory of firearms, fireworks, flares, ammunition, and loose propellant, we were told that there was no register or contents log. This was truly shocking. Afterwards [Colleague] and I spoke in private about how unbelievable it was that this container was secured only by a combination number padlock, and not even a lock with a key. This container had no dedicated CCTV camera on it nor was there an access log which those entering would be required to fill out. The lack of any controls around such lethal equipment was contrary to everything I have ever learned in the Defence Forces about access to locations containing firearms, ammunition, and volatile explosives. This extraordinary arrangement was contrary to the safe storage of pyrotechnics as I understood good practice from the Defence Forces. The container used to store seized pyrotechnics in the Defence Forces has an alarm and fire suppression system built in for safety. The set up within the Orange container was even different from the setup of the AGS container



used for illicit substances which was also located in AGS HQ.

I suggested we set up a camera on the container or alternatively move the container to a location less high traffic area next to the workshop where we could better supervise it. [THIS DID NOT HAPPEN] On one occasion I came across a person trying to gain access to the container. When I challenged him, he said he was a member of the NSU looking for some shotgun ammunition. While we had been told by [REDACTED 1] it was permissible to give AGS members ammunition from the container, I did not understand that to mean unfettered and unsupervised access to what was a potentially lethal cocktail of guns, ammunition and stored pyrotechnics.... When I asked how the NSU member knew the code for the only lock on the container door, he answered that [REDACTED 2] gave out the code to many people. I promptly changed the code... This incident did not result in management altering any of the highly inappropriate levels of security around this container. Proper security continued to be essentially non-existent. No notification was sent to the management of armed units with respect to the now required practice of requesting ammunition in the workshop.

no log of its contents



4 GARDA HOSPITAL
The disclosures make the point that the location of the container in a high traffic area was dangerous and completely inappropriate

1 THE CONTAINER
This image is from Google maps and was taken in 2025, Gardai would not say what is currently in the container

CHAIN OF EVIDENCE

There was a disagreement between Ballistics Section and Firearms Stores about which section was to receive and be responsible for firearms when they were no longer needed for evidentiary purposes. The padlocked container contained more than a hundred firearms originating from surrendered, seizure or from closed criminal cases. These firearms were handed into the Firearms Stores for destruction. It was these lethal weapons of unspecified individual provenance which were kept in the Orange Container. What I found extraordinary was that there were no warning signs whatsoever in vicinity of this improvised arms dump. When items were handed in, there was no policy or process in the Firearms Stores to record any Pulse IDs, serial numbers or any crucial identifying information relating to the materials, much of which was seized or surrendered evidence. As a result, these lethal firearms/materials were completely unaccounted for and undocumented. If questions were to arise from a cold case review or an inquiry as to innocence the absence of an appropriate system of control would make the value of such evidential materials very questionable. Most alarmingly, if ballistic evidence with respect to a gun or a number of guns was to be required in court to show that a firearm was used in other crimes, the evidential chain was entirely broken. There was no way of demonstrating that the gun had been in continuous storage and no way of assuring a court that it had not been removed and returned. The absence of a system of controls undermined any assurance which may have been required as evidence. In addition, some of the firearms were mounted for display in the Firearms Stores Main Office, these too were without provenance or control. Unlike the firearms store, Ballistics section did have a process for destroying firearms.

DESTRUCTION PROCESS

I am of the view that the failure by management to manage the orange container properly, to sort its contents, to retrieve what was useful and properly and carefully destroy the firearms which were marked for destruction and handed in in good faith for that purpose represented gross negligence. It was also a most serious misuse of public funds and most especially a risk and potential endangerment to the health and safety of those working in the vicinity of the container. Given the risk that functioning and lethal weapons could have been removed from the container and transferred without trace to criminal or

subversive organisations, I found the absence of a tight and controlled destruction process incredible. In the orange container, the Spider Stores, the workshop and admin office display cabinets alone was contained somewhere between one hundred to two hundred and fifty firearms long since surrendered to Firearms Stores for destruction. But these were never destroyed. There was no planning, procedure, or timeframe for the destruction of these firearms. There was never any register on which these firearms could be definitively identified and tracked.

LACK OF TRAINING

I was hired into An Garda Síochána as an attested member. I did not receive Garda training as is the norm. As an attested member I was formally given powers but none of the normally educational foundation upon which to exercise those powers. This created for me an insurmountable challenge, duty and responsibility without the requisite foundation and training. Nor was I given any of the normal induction which is common in joining a large organisation as a specialist. The working assumption seems to have been that my core skill as an armourer was going to be my 'day job' and the rest of the essential inculcation would take place on the job. Supporting Information: During the Basic Sig Pistol Course, in March 2018, we had been informed of the "Degrees of Force" doctrine. We were given to understand that possession of the range of less lethal options available to AGS was an essential element in a Garda being able to defend against accusations of excessive use of force. In practice, we were denied training and access to less lethal options leaving the lethal option as the only recourse.

I asked the Firearms Trainers what we (Armourers) were supposed to do as we were only being issued a firearm. They said to get trained on the other equipment before receiving a firearm as it was required by the An Garda Síochána Code of Conduct. The week after my firearms course, I raised this issue with [REDACTED3] who simply said, "Do you want a firearm or don't you?"

Over the course of my 18 months, I repeatedly requested training in various areas which I believed to be mandatory for all AGS members – • Basic An Garda Síochána procedures; • Emergency First Responder re-certification; • Baton; • Handcuffs; • CEW [Taser]; • OC spray [Pepper Spray]. This was all the more difficult for me because I was a member of the AGS but had no training nor any idea of my actual responsibilities. Early on, on 28th May 2018, [GARDA COLLEAGUE] and myself while leaving the Phoenix Park came across a traffic collision with multiple vehicles, unsure of what to do and having a van containing firearms and ammunition we drove off, I later found out a man died in this incident. This still weighs heavily on me and after that incident I made a medical bag for the work van... and requested medical training which [WAS] offered for the entire unit...



LACK OF RECORDS

It is extraordinary that in very heart of Garda HQ there was a disbursed [sic] system for storing and managing firearms and ammunition. There was no single secure location but rather a jumble of different inappropriate stores and rooms in which lethal materials were stored. As a result, accounting, control, and management of such materials was impossible. It seemed that both the safety, security and commercial considerations were subservient to convenience and long-established practice.

There was no effort made to ensure that lethal materials were accounted for. Each of the locations failed to operate any form of even rudimentary materials control system. No effort was made on either an

individual location basis or centrally to ensure that materials were identified, logged, valued, and accounted for. All superficial record systems were porous. That is to say they could be adjusted informally and after the fact. Nobody in management (finance, procurement, or administration) could know how much lethal equipment was on hand or where it was located. The finance and risk organisation could not know what value and or state of readiness it was in. There was no inspection regime or details of when locations were last inspected. There was no robust system tracking to whom what lethal equipment had actually been issued or what fault, service and reliability history attached to each piece of equipment.

NO RISK ASSESSMENT

When I first highlighted the container located beside the Chief Medical Officer building in Garda HQ, it contained years of accumulated fireworks and flares seized by AGS. It also contained approximately 40,000 to 50,000 rounds of 4.6x30mm ammunition that was faulty. This ammunition was replaced by the manufacturer, but AGS was stuck with the disposal of the faulty and potentially dangerous product.

This extraordinary situation involved in An Garda Síochána taking on an extraordinary risk to its personnel and facilities by agreeing to store rather than disposing of the faulty product...

In addition, I presume the cost of the container and its insurance was also borne by AGS. I wondered to myself whether any of this matter had been made known to the State Claims Agency who seek to manage state risk and who underwrite the risks for public bodies. It seems more likely, in the overall mismanagement of finance and procurement that

no proper risk advisory would have been provided to the State Claims Agency. Naturally these risk and financial matters remain to be fully investigated now by the C&AG on behalf of the taxpayer.

There was no Firearms Stores procedure for the storage of these items. There was no safety statement or risk assessment documentation. There was no inventory documentation. There was no markings or signage whatsoever identifying the contents of the container as being hazardous. The materials were partially placed in boxes and piled on the base of the container loosely.

The contents of this container were meant to be destroyed but it never was. The fact that there was no proper process or oversight into the management of stocks generally or specifically materials for destruction represents a major administrative and safety failure on the part of An Garda Síochána.